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ARTICLES
THE MANY FACES OF STRICT SCRUTINY: HOW THE SUPREME
COURT CHANGES THE RULES IN RACE CASES
Evan Gerstmann  and Christopher Shortell* †
ABSTRACT
In this paper, we argue that there is no single test called strict scrutiny
when the Court considers claims of racial discrimination. In fact, the Court
changes the rules depending on why and how the government is using race.
By examining racial redistricting, remedial affirmative action, and diversity-
based affirmative action cases, we show how the Court uses at least three very
different versions of strict scrutiny. The costs of maintaining the fiction of
unitary strict scrutiny is high. In the area of racial profiling, for example,
courts refuse to apply strict scrutiny for fear that it will either overly hamper
police or will weaken strict scrutiny in other areas of racial discrimination.
An open acknowledgment that the Court is already using different standards
of analysis for different types of racial discrimination would allow courts to
craft appropriate standards without fear of diminishing protections in other
areas.
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1. See, for example, Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
2. See, for example, Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
3. See, for example, Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
4. This phrase originated in Gerald Gunther, Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a
Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 8 (1972).
5. 473 U.S. 432 (1985).
6. William D. Araiza, The Section 5 Power and the Rational Basis Standard of Equal Protection,
79 TUL. L. REV. 519, 554 (2005) (“These problems suggest the difficulty the Court has had explaining its
‘rational basis plus’ cases. Indeed, Justice O’Connor was recently moved to acknowledge that cases such
as Cleburne and Romer involved something more than traditional rational basis review, a suggestion the
rest of the Court has not been willing to embrace, at least officially.”).
7. 518 U.S. 515, 524 (1996).
8. 515 U.S. 200, 237 (1995).
INTRODUCTION
All students of American constitutional law learn of the three-tiered tests
for alleged violations of the equal protection clause. Rational basis,
heightened scrutiny, and strict scrutiny are embedded deeply in our
understanding of how equal protection operates. For a law to pass the rational
basis test, there must be a reasonable relationship between the law and a
legitimate government purpose.  Heightened scrutiny, sometimes called1
“intermediate scrutiny,” requires that a law demonstrate a substantial
relationship to an important governmental purpose.  Strict scrutiny, the highest2
level of review, requires that a law be narrowly tailored to meet a compelling
governmental interest.  When rational basis is applied, the law is almost3
certain to survive, while strict scrutiny is “strict in theory, fatal in fact.”4
These descriptions are nearly truisms in the field of constitutional law—most
teachers can recite these principles in their sleep.
Most also recognize, however, that such descriptions greatly oversimplify
what the Court actually does in equal protection cases. Cases such as Romer
v. Evans and Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center  appear on their face to5
apply rational basis, but offer a significantly more stringent test than typical
rational basis analysis.  Heightened scrutiny was arguably revised by Justice6
Ginsburg in United States v. Virginia, to add the “exceedingly persuasive
justification” language.  The notion that strict scrutiny is strict in theory, but7
fatal in fact was addressed by Justice O’Connor in Adarand v. Pena, where
she indicated that strict scrutiny did not necessarily need to be fatal.8
Consistent with this, Adam Winkler has conducted empirical research
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9. Adam Winkler, Fatal in Theory and Strict in Fact: An Empirical Analysis of Strict Scrutiny in
the Federal Courts, 59 VAND. L. REV. 793 (2006).
10. See Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 294 (2004) (plurality opinion); Republican Party of Minn.
v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 774 (2002); Turner Broad. Sys. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 641–42 (1994).
11. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973); Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
demonstrating that in its application in federal courts, strict scrutiny is in fact,
not so fatal.9
In this paper, we argue that in light of these claims, legal scholars need
to fundamentally revisit the notion that strict scrutiny is an accurate
description for what courts do when faced with racial discrimination by the
government. In practice, the process is rarely as simple as looking for a
compelling interest and then evaluating whether the law is narrowly tailored.
While the language is the same, the meaning of strict scrutiny varies
tremendously from subject area to subject area within equal protection
jurisprudence. Strict scrutiny in the area of remedial affirmative action is not
the same as strict scrutiny in diversity-based affirmative action. Likewise,
strict scrutiny in racial redistricting differs from strict scrutiny in either type
of affirmative action. Applying the same term to these disparate tests is
misleading and prevents a clearer understanding of how courts treat equal
protection claims. Further, we will show that it inhibits the courts from
developing a coherent response to issues such as racial profiling by the
government.
A simple example from another area of constitutional law should help
clarify our point. The Supreme Court has often stated that violations of the
First Amendment trigger strict scrutiny.  In the field of First Amendment10
litigation, restrictions on freedom of speech are not resolved by applying one
test to all types of cases. The Court applies one test for advocacy of illegal
action and another test for obscenity. While each test shares some similarities,
the tests are conceptually and practically different. For example,
“offensiveness” is a key component of the Miller test for obscenity, while the
Brandenberg test for advocacy of illegal action self-consciously excludes any
consideration of offensiveness: the Ku Klux Klan and Martin Luther King are
treated the same.  We argue that an understanding of strict scrutiny in equal11
protection ought to be more similar to that in First Amendment analysis than
is presently the case.
To develop our argument, we look at three different areas of equal
protection law and explore how the Court actually scrutinizes race-conscious
decision making in each area. Racial redistricting, remedial affirmative action,
and diversity-based affirmative action cases have dominated the Court’s
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12. While other issues, such as mandatory busing of students to achieve racial integration, were once
major issues for the courts, they no longer represent a significant number of cases where the courts apply
strict scrutiny. Winkler, supra note 9, at 833–34.
13. 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
14. Angelo N. Ancheta, Contextual Strict Scrutiny and Race-Conscious Policy Making, 36 LOY.
U. CHI. L.J. 21 (2004); Eric K. Yamamoto, Carly Minner & Karen Winter, Contextual Strict Scrutiny, 49
HOW. L.J. 241 (2006).
15. Yamamoto et al., supra note 14, at 244.
jurisprudence on equal protection over the last two decades and provide a
useful set of case law from which to examine strict scrutiny.  What we find12
is that while the language of “compelling governmental interest” and
“narrowly tailored” is dutifully used in each case, the meaning and use of
those terms varies enormously. The various equal protection tests labeled as
strict scrutiny are as different from one another as the Miller test is from the
Brandenberg test.
Our argument significantly furthers other recent research on equal
protection. In the wake of the Court’s reaffirmation that strict scrutiny is not
necessarily fatal in Grutter v. Bollinger,  other scholars have identified what13
they term “contextual strict scrutiny.”  This approach suggests that the strict14
scrutiny test is more than simply “compelling government interest” and
“narrowly tailored.” Contextual strict scrutiny means that the Court takes the
context of the challenge into consideration in determining whether or not strict
scrutiny is met. The authors of one article on contextual strict scrutiny identify
four analytical inquiries in which the Court engages when applying strict
scrutiny—(1) racial group history and current racial conditions; (2) the
distinction between exclusionary and inclusionary policies; (3) whether the
policy is motivated by prejudice or harmful group stereotypes; and (4) whether
the range of realistic alternatives was considered.  While a useful beginning15
to understanding how strict scrutiny actually operates, this approach works
overly hard to retain the notion that strict scrutiny is one uniform test. The
sooner this notion is dispelled, the better. That is our goal.
Beginning with racial redistricting and then moving on to the two types
of affirmative action, we will examine the case law for each subject area,
focusing on three critical areas. The first is how the Court determines whether
to apply strict scrutiny. The second is how the Court has interpreted the term
“compelling governmental interest” in the context of that area of law. Finally,
we will look at how “narrowly tailored” has been interpreted and applied.
Through this careful review, we aim to demonstrate that strict scrutiny has
many faces—the Supreme Court applies different rules depending on the
circumstances in which race is used.
6 UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH LAW REVIEW [Vol. 72:1
16. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 208–36 (1962).
17. 377 U.S. 533, 564–68 (1964).
18. See Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267 (2004); League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry, 548
U.S. 399 (2006).
19. 365 U.S. 339 (1960).
20. 512 U.S. 997 (1994).
21. 512 U.S. 874 (1994).
I. RACIAL REDISTRICTING
The process of redistricting is a tremendously complex one, with various
cross-cutting demands and goals. Maintaining roughly equal populations in
districts and keeping political subdivisions together sit alongside the goals of
incumbency protection and partisan electoral gain. Given the inherently
political and partisan nature of the exercise of redistricting, federal courts long
avoided addressing inequities and problems in its practice. By the 1960s,
however, the Court ruled that such a position had become untenable and
moved redistricting out of the nonjusticiable category of political questions.16
Reynolds v. Sims, for example, required that each person’s vote be counted
roughly equal.  However, redistricting is an area where the Court has17
struggled in developing consistent standards. Issues such as the justiciability
of partisan gerrymandering continue to divide the justices.18
Race, too, has a place in the calculations of State legislators when
redistricting. The critical question is how much of a role it can legitimately
play. That is the issue that has troubled the Court. As far back as Gomillion
v. Lightfoot,  the Court has recognized that redistricting can be done in ways19
that harm racial minorities and violate the Constitution. The Court in
Gomillion ruled that Tuskegee, Alabama could not redraw its city boundaries
to exclude all of the African-American neighborhoods. Such explicit examples
of racial segregation are, in a sense, the easy cases. Moving beyond clear
attempts at exclusion, the picture becomes much murkier.
Legal challenges to race-based redistricting are comprised of a complex
mixture of Fourteenth Amendment, Fifteenth Amendment, and Voting Rights
Act (VRA) claims. Gomillion was a straightforward Fifteenth Amendment
case. Cases such as Johnson v. Grandy  and Holder v. Hall  rely exclusively20 21
upon Section 2 of the VRA. Most of the Supreme Court’s racial redistricting
cases, however, have involved some combination of the Fourteenth
Amendment and the VRA. In each case, the Court has considered whether
strict scrutiny should apply, looked for a compelling government interest, and
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22. Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 643 (1993) [hereinafter Shaw I].
23. See, for example, Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 916 (1995) (“Redistricting legislatures will,
for example, almost always be aware of racial demographics; but it does not follow that race predominates
in the redistricting process.”).
24. 430 U.S. 144, 165 (1977).
25. Id. at 167 (quoting Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735, 752 (1973)).
then determined whether the law is narrowly tailored to meet those interests.
While the language and process is consistent, our interest is in the meaning
that the Court gives to each of those terms. In order to determine that, we will
follow the flow of decision making through the different cases.
A. Should Strict Scrutiny Apply?
The first step for the Court, when faced with an equal protection
challenge, is to determine what level of review should apply. Where there is
a suspect classification, usually involving race, strict scrutiny is the
appropriate test. In summarizing the case law in 1993, the Court stated that,
“we have held that the Fourteenth Amendment requires State legislation that
expressly distinguishes among citizens because of their race to be narrowly
tailored to further a compelling governmental interest.”  But does the Court22
actually apply strict scrutiny whenever race is a relevant criterion in
government decision making? A close reading of the redistricting cases shows
that the trigger for strict scrutiny is not so straightforward. If a legislature is
“aware” of race in developing a redistricting plan, that alone is not suspect
even though it involves a suspect classification.  In 1977, seven justices23
rejected appellants’ contention that race could never legitimately be taken into
account in redistricting and a majority held that even racial quotas in
redistricting was acceptable. As Justice White wrote in his opinion for United
Jewish Organizations of Williamsburg v. Carey,
there is no doubt that in preparing the 1974 legislation, the State deliberately used
race in a purposeful manner. But its plan represented no racial slur or stigma with
respect to whites or any other race, and we discern no discrimination violative of the
Fourteenth Amendment nor any abridgment of the right to vote on account of race
within the meaning of the Fifteenth Amendment.24
A claim cannot exist except where a racial group’s voting strength has been
“invidiously minimized.”  By 1977, the Court made it clear that redistricting25
laws involving race do not necessarily trigger strict scrutiny. It is not just that
compliance with the VRA could satisfy strict scrutiny, but that strict scrutiny
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26. Shaw I, 509 U.S. at 642.
27. Id. (emphasis added).
28. Id. at 655–56.
29. 515 U.S. 900 (1995).
30. Id. at 916.
31. Id. (emphasis added). The Court’s preference for this standard was reiterated in Shaw v. Hunt,
517 U.S. 899, 905 (1996) [hereinafter Shaw II]:
While it would have been preferable for the court to have analyzed the case in terms of the
standard laid down in Miller, that was not possible [because Miller was not decided yet when
the District Court heard the case]. This circumstance has no consequence here because we think
itself is not an appropriate standard in these cases. The scope of United Jewish
Organization’s decision has been significantly narrowed in the intervening
years, but as will be seen, the core holding that consideration of race does not
automatically trigger strict scrutiny has been reaffirmed repeatedly by
subsequent courts.
Major change in the Court’s redistricting jurisprudence began with Shaw
I, in 1993. In that case, the Court considered whether a North Carolina
redistricting plan that established two majority-minority districts violated the
Fourteenth Amendment. The Court acknowledged once again that “race-
conscious redistricting is not always unconstitutional.”  While deciding to26
apply strict scrutiny in the case, the Court held that such a test is appropriate
when redistricting legislation “is so extremely irregular on its face that it
rationally can be viewed only as an effort to segregate the races for purposes
of voting, without regard for traditional districting principles and without
sufficiently compelling justification.”  The italicized part of this passage is27
critical. Strict scrutiny is appropriate in racial redistricting cases not simply
when race is expressly a factor in the decision making of legislators, but when
they have also ignored traditional districting principles. In Shaw I, the Court
placed great emphasis on the “bizarre” shape of the challenged districts as a
reason for examining them more closely.28
The Court further emphasized the importance of the element of
determining whether strict scrutiny should apply two years later in Miller v.
Johnson.  Though accepting that strict scrutiny could apply to race-based29
redistricting, the Court qualified that ruling by noting “the distinction between
being aware of racial considerations and being motivated by them.”30
Legislators can be “aware” of racial considerations and that would not trigger
strict scrutiny. It is only when plaintiffs can show “that race was the
predominant factor motivating the legislature’s decision to place a significant
number of voters within or without a particular district,” that strict scrutiny
applies.  The Miller Court continued,31
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that the District Court’s findings, read in the light of the evidence that it had before it, comport
with the Miller standard.
32. Miller, 515 U.S. at 920 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
33. Id. at 916.
34. Shaw II, 517 U.S. at 905 (citing Miller, 515 U.S. at 911).
35. Shaw II, 517 U.S. at 907 (citing Miller, 515 U.S. at 916).
36. 517 U.S. 952, 958 (1996) (citation omitted). Justices Thomas and Scalia argued in a concurring
opinion that strict scrutiny should apply whenever race is a consideration, but the combination of the
plurality and the dissenting justices means that a strong majority of the Court do not accept that approach.
37. Id. at 965.
Race was, as the District Court found, the predominant, overriding factor explaining
the General Assembly’s decision to attach to the Eleventh District various
appendages containing dense majority-black populations. As a result, Georgia’s
congressional redistricting plan cannot be upheld unless it satisfies strict scrutiny,
our most rigorous and exacting standard of constitutional review.32
The Court acknowledges that race is almost always a factor in legislative
redistricting—it simply cannot be the predominant factor. If it is, then strict
scrutiny applies. As with Shaw I, considering race in redistricting is a
necessary, but not sufficient factor to trigger strict scrutiny. There must also
be either direct evidence of legislative discriminatory intent or a failure to
follow traditional districting principles.  The Court reiterated this33
construction in two cases the following year. In Shaw v. Hunt (Shaw II), Chief
Justice Rehnquist wrote that “the constitutional wrong occurs when race
becomes the ‘dominant and controlling’ consideration”  and reemphasized34
the Miller holding that “strict scrutiny applies when race is the ‘predominant’
consideration in drawing the district lines such that ‘the legislature
subordinate[s] traditional race-neutral districting principles . . . to racial
considerations.’”35
In summing up the recent case law in Bush v. Vera, the plurality opinion
made it clear that “strict scrutiny does not apply merely because redistricting
is performed with consciousness of race. Nor does it apply to all cases of
intentional creation of majority-minority districts.”  Later in the same36
opinion, the Court acknowledged that where “race was not the only factor . . .
we must scrutinize each challenged district to determine whether the district
court’s conclusion that race predominated over legitimate districting
considerations, including incumbency, can be sustained.”  Justice O’Connor37
was even more explicit in her concurring opinion, stating that “so long as they
do not subordinate traditional districting criteria to the use of race for its own
sake or as a proxy, States may intentionally create majority-minority districts,
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38. Id. at 993.
39. 526 U.S. 541 (1999) [hereinafter Cromartie I]; 532 U.S. 234 (2001) [hereinafter Cromartie II].
40. Cromartie I, 526 U.S. at 547.
41. This was the fourth time North Carolina’s redistricting plan was considered by the Supreme
Court.
42. Cromartie II, 532 U.S. at 243.
and may otherwise take race into consideration, without coming under strict
scrutiny.”38
One objection to this analysis that could be raised, is that the Court is
simply engaging in semantic games, but in practice it overturns any
redistricting where race is a consideration. The twin cases of Hunt v.
Cromartie and Easley v. Cromartie serve to dispel this particular objection.39
In 1999, a majority of Justices voted to overturn a summary judgment for the
plaintiffs at the district court level over the same North Carolina redistricting
at issue in Shaw I and Shaw II. A 1997 redistricting plan led plaintiffs to claim
that the plan unconstitutionally considered race. The district court agreed and
granted summary judgment to the plaintiffs. On appeal, all nine justices voted
to reverse, holding that, while race may have been a consideration, there was
not sufficient evidence in the record yet to conclude that it was the
predominant consideration. Political considerations such as incumbent
protection, partisan reliability, and the similarity of concerns between
different urban areas were all alternative explanations. The opinion, consistent
with the cases that came before, noted that “in this context, strict scrutiny
applies if race was the ‘predominant factor’ motivating the legislature’s
districting decision.”  By 2001, the case was back before the Supreme40
Court.  The district court had proceeded with trial and again concluded that41
the redistricting was unconstitutional. On review, a five-justice majority ruled
that the plaintiffs were not successful in proving race was a predominant
consideration rather than merely one consideration among many others. “The
critical district court determination—the matter for which we remanded this
litigation—consists of the finding that race rather than politics predominantly
explains District 12’s 1997 boundaries.”  In this sequence of cases, the Court42
put into practice its language about the predominance standard and upheld a
redistricting plan without applying strict scrutiny despite the role that race
unquestionably played. An accurate description of the standard for strict
scrutiny in racial redistricting cases, then, is that it is triggered where plaintiffs
can prove that race was the predominant factor in legislative decision making.
That stands in contrast to the notion in other areas of equal protection law that
2010] THE MANY FACES OF STRICT SCRUTINY 11
43. In League of United Latin American Citizens, 548 U.S. at 517, Justice Scalia sums up the
Court’s jurisprudence on this point: “[R]ace may be a motivation in redistricting as long as it is not the
predominant one.”
44. Miller, 515 U.S. at 921.
45. Id. at 922.
46. See Shaw I, 509 U.S. at 655.
strict scrutiny applies wherever there are laws that explicitly take race into
account, even if done so in conjunction with other factors.43
B. Compelling Governmental Interest
Once strict scrutiny is triggered in racial redistricting cases, what
constitutes a compelling governmental interest? The Court has hinted at what
would satisfy that requirement, although it has hardly offered conclusive
answers. In the racial redistricting cases from Shaw I on, the Court has
identified three possible compelling governmental interests. The most
commonly claimed governmental interest is compliance with Section 2 of the
VRA. The Court has never clearly answered the question of whether
compliance with Section 2 alone would be sufficient, despite hearing several
cases directly on point. In Miller v. Johnson, the Court appeared to be
skeptical, but then switched to statutory interpretation of the VRA, stating
“compliance with federal antidiscrimination laws cannot justify race-based
districting where the challenged district was not reasonably necessary under
a constitutional reading and application of those laws.”  In Shaw II, the Court44
again avoided addressing the issue by assuming arguendo that compliance was
a compelling interest, then striking the redistricting plan down on the grounds
that it was not narrowly tailored. One element of this claim that the Court does
make clear, however, is that an order from the Justice Department to comply
with Section 2 is not sufficient. In Miller, the majority ruled that “were we to
accept the Justice Department’s objection itself as a compelling interest
adequate to insulate racial districting from constitutional review, we would be
surrendering to the Executive Branch our role in enforcing the constitutional
limits on race-based official action.”  The Court reserves the right to interpret45
Section 2 definitively for itself.
The Court has acknowledged that undoing past discrimination can be a
compelling interest.  However, it has established two caveats to this doctrine.46
First, “while the States and their subdivisions may take remedial action when
they possess evidence of past or present discrimination, they must identify that
discrimination, public or private, with some specificity before they may use
12 UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH LAW REVIEW [Vol. 72:1
47. Shaw II, 517 U.S. at 909 (quoting Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 504 (1989)).
48. Id. at 910 (quoting Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education, 476 U.S. 267, 277 (1986)).
49. Miller, 515 U.S. at 926 (quoting Beer v. United States, 425 U.S. 130, 141 (1976)).
50. Shaw I, 509 U.S. at 655.
51. 517 U.S. 952, 983 (1996).
52. 548 U.S. at 518 (Scalia, J., concurring and dissenting); 548 U.S. at 485 n.2 (Souter, J.,
concurring and dissenting). Justice Scalia, writing for Justices Thomas and Alito and Chief Justice Roberts,
states: “We have in the past left undecided whether compliance with federal antidiscrimination laws can
be a compelling State interest. I would hold that compliance with § 5 of the Voting Rights Act can be such
an interest.” Justice Souter, writing for Justice Ginsburg, notes: “Like Justice Stevens, I agree with Justice
Scalia that compliance with § 5 is a compelling state interest.”
race-conscious relief.”  This means that efforts to resolve broad societal47
discrimination are not sufficient—there must be a specific cause. And
secondly, “the institution that makes the racial distinction must have had a
‘strong basis in evidence’ to conclude that remedial action was necessary,
‘before it embarks on an affirmative-action program.’”  Even where48
discrimination can be identified, there must be separate evidence that such
remedial action is not only desirable, but necessary. None of the racial
redistricting cases have been found to meet these criteria, despite evidence of
widespread racial discrimination in voting in the past. In fact, each case has
come out of a State covered by the VRA and requiring preclearance from the
Department of Justice. Nonetheless, that fact alone is not sufficient to
establish a compelling governmental interest for the Court.
The final compelling governmental interest, claimed by States, is
avoidance of retrogression in minority voting power under Section 5 of the
VRA. Section 5 requires that there be no “retrogression in the position of
racial minorities with respect to their effective exercise of the electoral
franchise.”  The Court has accepted that this is a compelling interest, but it49
again takes a narrow view of what constitutes retrogression. In Shaw I, the
Court ruled that “[a] reapportionment plan would not be narrowly tailored to
the goal of avoiding retrogression if the State went beyond what was
reasonably necessary to avoid retrogression.”  In Bush v. Vera, the Court50
clarified this position, noting that “nonretrogression is not a license for the
State to do whatever it deems necessary to ensure continued electoral success;
it merely mandates that the minority’s opportunity to elect representatives of
its choice not be diminished, directly or indirectly, by the State’s actions.”51
In the fractured opinions of League of United Latin American Citizens v.
Perry, seven justices did accept Texas’ nonretrogression claim in defense of
one of the districts that was created.  The majority opinion did not address the52
question because of the ruling on a Section 2 violation in another district,
2010] THE MANY FACES OF STRICT SCRUTINY 13
53. Id. at 442.
54. See Shaw II, 517 U.S. at 915.
55. Id.
56. See id. at 946–47 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
57. Id. at 916.
58. Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. at 977 (citation omitted).
which precluded directly addressing the retrogression issue.  Two concurring53
and one dissenting opinion, however, explicitly made the point. In all of the
cases since Shaw I, this is the only one where a majority of Justices made it
clear that a State met the compelling governmental interest standard.
C. Narrowly Tailored
The final inquiry in applying strict scrutiny is to determine whether the
law is narrowly tailored to meet the compelling governmental interest
identified. As the Court has acknowledged, it has been less than precise in
explaining what “narrowly tailored” actually means.  In the area of54
redistricting, the Court provides the following guidance: “we have always
expected that the legislative action would substantially address, if not achieve,
the avowed purpose.”  Such a standard could reasonably be assumed to apply55
to any equal protection challenge. In redistricting, however, the test is given
a little more specificity. In Shaw II, the State alleged that the redistricting plan
was narrowly tailored to meet the goal of avoiding Section 2 liability. After
passage of the plan, the State was clearly not liable for violating Section 2.56
For the majority, such an interpretation of the connection required was not
sufficiently narrow. The district as drawn, could not remedy any potential
Section 2 violation because “a plaintiff must show that the minority group is
‘geographically compact’ to establish Section 2 liability. No one looking at
District 12 could reasonably suggest that the district contained a
‘geographically compact’ population of any race.”57
In Bush v. Vera, however, the Court backed off from the strictest
interpretation of its holding. The district court had required that in order for
the law to be narrowly tailored, it “must have the least possible amount of
irregularity in shape, making allowances for traditional districting criteria.”58
The majority rejected that standard and held instead that “[a] § 2 district that
is reasonably compact and regular, taking into account traditional districting
principles such as maintaining communities of interest and traditional
boundaries, may pass strict scrutiny without having to defeat rival compact
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districts designed by plaintiffs’ experts in endless ‘beauty contests.’”59
However, the Court did not abandon its emphasis on geographical
compactness. The Court reiterated its position that a redistricting plan is
narrowly tailored only when a reasonably compact majority-minority district
is created. “If, because of the dispersion of the minority population, a
reasonably compact majority-minority district cannot be created, § 2 does not
require a majority-minority district; if a reasonably compact district can be
created, nothing in § 2 requires the race-based creation of a district that is far
from compact.”60
In his concurring in part and dissenting in part opinion in League of
United Latin American Citizens v. Perry in 2006, Justice Scalia suggests a
possible test for narrow tailoring in compliance with the VRA. In his
interpretation, “a State cannot use racial considerations to achieve results
beyond those that are required to comply with the statute.”  Justice Scalia was61
joined by three other Justices, but a majority has not yet adopted this
approach.  That leaves the requirements of narrow tailoring in redistricting62
still somewhat vague, but it is clear that geographic compactness of the
minority population and resulting district is very important to pass strict
scrutiny review.
D. Strict Scrutiny and Redistricting
Where does strict scrutiny stand in the area of redistricting? As detailed
above, in order to trigger strict scrutiny, race must be the predominant factor
in drawing district lines. Once strict scrutiny is identified as the appropriate
test, the Court must determine whether there is a compelling governmental
interest. Three possible interests have been identified, with varying success.
Compliance with Section 2 of the VRA is possibly compelling on its own, but
only within the narrow interpretation of the statute provided by the Court.
Remedying past discrimination is a compelling governmental interest, but
there must be an identification of specific discrimination in the past that the
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law is addressing and the remedy must be shown to be necessary. Finally,
compliance with Section 5 of the VRA is a compelling governmental interest,
but that compliance is only compelling when avoiding retrogression, not when
trying to increase minority voting power. It is worth noting, however, that a
finding of retrogression can rest solely on the effect of the redistricting rather
than any evidence of discriminatory intent by the legislature.  The final step63
is to consider whether the redistricting plan is narrowly tailored. The only
guidance the Court has provided in this regard is that a redistricting plan must
be reasonably compact in order to qualify as narrowly tailored. In moving on
to the affirmative action decisions, we will see that these tests are distinct
from other meanings given to strict scrutiny and ought to be recognized as
such.
II. REMEDIAL VS. DIVERSITY-BASED AFFIRMATIVE ACTION
Affirmative action is the most heavily litigated issue involving race and
the Constitution. It has been the issue in the overwhelming majority of cases
where federal courts have applied strict scrutiny to race-conscious action by
the government, with race-conscious redistricting representing almost all the
rest of such cases.64
Ostensibly, the courts subject affirmative action programs to the same
constitutional test as racial redistricting: strict scrutiny. As we will see though,
the constitutional test applied to affirmative action programs has little in
common with the constitutional test applied to racial redistricting. We will
also see that it is actually misleading to speak about the scrutiny applied to
affirmative action as a single constitutional test. There are in fact, two kinds
of affirmative action programs. What this article refers to as “remedial”
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affirmative action programs are designed to compensate for direct or indirect
governmental discrimination, while “diversity-based” affirmative action
programs are designed to promote a diverse dialogue, usually in educational
institutions.  The constitutional tests applied to these two separate types of65
affirmative action programs are very different from one another and both tests
are quite different from the test applied to racial redistricting. In sum, rather
than there being a unitary strict scrutiny test applied to racial classifications,
there are several distinct tests with more differences than commonalities.
The next section will lay out strict scrutiny as applied to remedial
affirmative action and contrast it with the form of strict scrutiny used in racial
redistricting. The section after that will lay out strict scrutiny as applied to
diversity-based affirmative action and contrast it with the other two types of
strict scrutiny.
III. REMEDIAL AFFIRMATIVE ACTION
The Supreme Court first upheld a remedial action plan in a 1986 decision,
Local 28 of the Sheet Metal Workers’ International Association v. EEOC,66
and again in 1987 in United States v. Paradise.  Both cases involved67
egregious, long term job discrimination against African Americans and in both
cases the petitioners repeatedly resisted court orders designed to remedy the
discrimination. For example, in Local 28 the union suspended court ordered
job searches, made only “token efforts” to hire minorities, and disregarded
selection tests in which minorities did well based upon their assertion that the
minority candidates received “unfair tutoring.”  In Paradise, the Court found68
“unexplained and unexplainable” the fact that the Alabama Department of
Public Safety had failed to hire even a single African-American trooper in its
thirty-seven year history.69
Federal courts responded by imposing stringent affirmative action
requirements on both Local 28 and the Alabama Department of Public Safety.
In Local 28, the district court upheld a 29% nonwhite membership goal, and
other measures such as maintaining separate detailed membership records for
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blacks and whites, as well as engaging in extensive recruitment of minorities.70
The goal was later made even more precise when the order was modified to
require a goal of 29.23% non-white membership.  In the Paradise case, the71
district court “issued an order (1972 order) enjoining the Department to hire
one black trooper for each white trooper hired until blacks constituted
approximately 25% of the state trooper force.”72
Applying strict scrutiny, the Supreme Court upheld both of these orders.
However, while doing so, it laid out a form of scrutiny that is, by far, the most
genuinely strict of any such test. As we will see in the next section, the
standards set out by the Court are so strict that if they were applied to
diversity-based affirmative action, such as the University of Michigan Law
School plan upheld by the Court in Grutter v. Bollinger,  this form of scrutiny73
would indeed be “strict in theory and fatal in fact.”
The Supreme Court has consistently held that the “Government
unquestionably has a compelling interest in remedying past and present
discrimination” that is practiced directly by the government.  This compelling74
interest also extends to rectifying indirect discrimination by the government.
An example is where the government has become a “passive participant” in
racial exclusion by granting contracts to general contractors who use that
money to discriminate against minority subcontractors.  As we will see75
though, the Court not only requires a convincing showing that such
discrimination has occurred, but it also demands clear evidence that the
discrimination was purposeful and that a race-conscious remedy is needed to
correct it.
The greater rigor of the strict scrutiny test in this area is manifest in every
aspect. The Court is quicker to apply strict scrutiny to affirmative action than
it is to racial redistricting and it requires stronger evidence that a compelling
interest exists for race-conscious remedies. The greater strictness is also
evident when the Court explains how it determines whether an affirmative
action plan is narrowly tailored:
In determining whether race-conscious remedies are appropriate, we look to several
factors, including the necessity for the relief and the efficacy of alternative remedies;
the flexibility and duration of the relief, including the availability of waiver
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provisions; the relationship of the numerical goals to the relevant labor market; and
the impact of the relief on the rights of third parties.76
As will be explained below, the Court strictly enforces all of these elements.
The affirmative action plans in Local 28 and Paradise survived strict
scrutiny due in large part, to the longstanding and egregious conduct of the
petitioners in those cases, and also due to the very limited duration and limited
burden on third parties of the race-conscious measures. However, subsequent
cases have demonstrated just how high a bar the Court has set for remedial
affirmative action programs and how different the strict scrutiny in these cases
is from the scrutiny applied in racial redistricting cases.
A. Should Strict Scrutiny Apply?
The Supreme Court is much quicker to apply strict scrutiny to affirmative
action cases than it is to racial redistricting cases. Recall that in the districting
cases, the Court repeatedly held that since some use of race is inevitable it will
only apply strict scrutiny when race is the predominant factor in district line
drawing. By contrast, in remedial affirmative action cases, the Court has held
that it will apply strict scrutiny to all cases where any racial classification is
used by the government. In the 1989 case City of Richmond v. Croson, the
Court reviewed a remedial affirmative action program that “required prime
contractors to whom the city awarded construction contracts to subcontract at
least 30% of the dollar amount of the contract to one or more Minority
Business Enterprises (MBE’s).”  In applying strict scrutiny, the Court made77
clear that the issue was not whether the use of race was predominant. As the
Court later described the case; “[w]ith Croson the Court finally agreed that the
Fourteenth Amendment requires strict scrutiny of all race-based action by
state and local governments.”  The only caveat was that there was still a78
question about whether federal, affirmative action programs, as opposed to
State and local programs, were subject to the same stringent rule. This
question was answered six years later, in Adarand Constructors v. Pena.  In79
reviewing a federal remedial affirmative action program, the Court held that
“any person, of whatever race, has the right to demand that any government
actor subject to the Constitution justify any racial classification subjecting that
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person to unequal treatment under the strictest judicial scrutiny.”  Thus, in80
contrast to the redistricting cases, the Court has never declined to apply strict
scrutiny on the basis that the use of race in a remedial affirmative action plan
was not “predominant.”
B. Compelling Governmental Interest
Not only is the Court quicker to apply strict scrutiny to remedial
affirmative action cases, but it also much stricter in determining whether there
is a compelling government interest. Recall that in racial districting cases,
there are three possible compelling interests: compliance with Section 2 of the
VRA, remedying intentional discrimination, and avoiding retrogression of
minority voting power. While the Court’s treatment of intentional
discrimination is the same in both redistricting and remedial affirmative action
cases, there is a major difference overall. Completely apart from remedying
intentional discrimination, in the redistricting cases, the Court has held that
there is a compelling government interest in avoiding minority retrogression,
especially if such retrogression would run afoul of the Voting Rights Act.
Proving that a particular redistricting plan would weaken existing minority
voting power, i.e., produce fewer districts with a majority of minority voters,
is relatively simple because there is no requirement that the retrogression be
intentional. For example, race-conscious districting is permissible, in fact it
may be required under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, if an annexation by
a city reduces the proportion of majority minority districts, even if that
outcome is unintentional.  Since it is far easier to prove objective impact than81
it is to prove subjective intent, it is not surprising that seven justices were
willing to acknowledge avoiding retrogression as a compelling government
interest.82
In contrast, the Court is adamant that there is no compelling interest in
having a remedial affirmative action plan without proof of intentional
discrimination by the government or by general contractors using government
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money. In this area, there is no such thing as a compelling governmental
interest based solely upon adverse impact on racial minorities. In Croson,
defenders of the remedial action plan had strong evidence that minorities were
vastly underrepresented in terms of receiving government construction
contracts. As the Croson Court noted,
Proponents of the set-aside provision relied on a study which indicated that, while
the general population of Richmond was 50% black, only 0.67% of the city’s prime
construction contracts had been awarded to minority businesses in the 5-year period
from 1978 to 1983. It was also established that a variety of contractors’ associations,
whose representatives appeared in opposition to the ordinance, had virtually no
minority businesses within their membership.83
This was not sufficient to establish a compelling governmental interest in
creating the affirmative action program because the exclusion of minorities
was not proven to be intentional. The Court found that, “[t]here was no direct
evidence of race discrimination on the part of the city in letting contracts or
any evidence that the city’s prime contractors had discriminated against
minority-owned subcontractors.”84
The difference between these two approaches, as to whether an adverse
impact on minorities must be intentional, is extremely significant. While
impact is relatively simple to demonstrate, proving a subjective desire to
discriminate is usually very difficult.  Since the Court has held that85
preventing retrogression of minority voting power is a compelling interest in
racial districting cases, regardless of whether the retrogression is intentional,
the scrutiny in remedial affirmative action cases can be understood as clearly
more demanding in this regard than in the racial redistricting cases. For
example, if a town implemented a new rule that government contracts would
only be awarded to locally owned businesses, even if that had a significant but
unintended negative impact on minority participation, there is nothing in the
Court’s jurisprudence to indicate that avoiding such an impact would be a
compelling governmental interest. In contrast, as noted earlier, if a town
annexed a new property, avoiding any inadvertent retrogression of minority
voting power would indeed be a compelling interest.
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C. Narrowly Tailored?
Another important difference between these two types of strict scrutiny
is the level of evidence the Court requires to justify race-based action in the
particular case before it. In a remedial affirmative action case, even if there is
a credible allegation of intentional discrimination, the Court demands that the
government prove that a race-based plan is necessary to address the effects of
that discrimination. In Croson, not only had the City found that African
Americans were underrepresented in the local construction industry, but also,
that “Congress made a determination that the effects of past discrimination
had stifled minority participation in the construction industry nationally.”86
Nonetheless, the Court held that: “None of these ‘findings,’ singly or together,
provide the city of Richmond with a ‘strong basis in evidence for its
conclusion that remedial action was necessary’ . . . . Racial classifications are
suspect, and that means that simple legislative assurances of good intention
cannot suffice.”  The Court specifically pointed out that, “[t]here does not87
appear to have been any consideration of the use of race-neutral means to
increase minority participation in City contracting.” Similarly, in the 1986
case, Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education, the Supreme Court struck down
a remedial affirmative action plan, holding that the government had not shown
that a race-based plan was necessary:
Evidentiary support for the conclusion that remedial action is warranted becomes
crucial when the remedial program is challenged in court by non-minority employees
. . . unless such a determination is made, an appellate court reviewing a challenge by
nonminority employees to remedial action cannot determine whether the race-based
action is justified as a remedy for prior discrimination.88
In contrast, there is no requirement that the State consider race-neutral
approaches to avoiding retrogression of minority voting power. As shown
above, if race-blind line drawing would weaken minority voting power by
reducing the number of minority-majority districts, then the Court assumes
that race-conscious line drawing is constitutional as long as the plan is
narrowly tailored to avoid retrogression of minority voting power. There are
of course other measures, such as using cumulative voting and single
transferable vote systems, which are race-neutral and are believed by many
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political scientists to prevent minority vote dilution.  In sharp contrast though,89
strict scrutiny in districting cases does not require a “strong basis in evidence”
that a race-conscious remedy is a necessity to avoid retrogression.
Another stark difference between the two strict scrutiny tests is their
approach to durational limits. When the Court has looked at whether race-
conscious remedial affirmative action programs are “narrowly tailored,” it has
repeatedly emphasized that such programs must be as temporary as possible.
There is no equivalent requirement in the redistricting version of strict
scrutiny.
Even in cases where the government’s racial discrimination has been
severe and direct, the Court has emphasized the requirement that remedial
affirmative action plans be temporary. In Paradise, the Supreme Court upheld
the lower court’s remedial order, stating:
Finally, the Department was ordered to submit within 30 days a schedule for the
development of promotion procedures for all ranks above the entry level. The
schedule was to be “based upon realistic expectations” as the court intended that “the
use of the quotas . . . be a one-time occurrence.” The District Court reasoned that,
under the order it had entered, the Department had “the prerogative to end the
promotional quotas at any time, simply by developing acceptable promotion
procedures.”90
Similarly, in Local 28, another case with proven, egregious governmental
discrimination, the Court emphasized that race-based programs, even goals,
as opposed to quotas, are to be temporary: “Finally, a district court may find
it necessary to order interim hiring or promotional goals pending the
development of nondiscriminatory hiring or promotion procedures.”  In other91
cases, the Supreme Court has rejected affirmative action programs that were
justified as promoting a diverse set of role models because such reasoning
“could be used to ‘justify’ race-based decision making essentially limitless in
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scope and [the] duration” would be “timeless in their ability to affect the
future.”92
This concern, that race-conscious remedies be temporary, is utterly
lacking from the racial redistricting cases. There is no hint that a policy of
race-conscious line drawing must be limited in duration in order to be
narrowly tailored. It is true that States redistrict every ten years, but there is
no requirement, for example, that during redistricting, the government review
whether there is still sufficiently prevalent racial bloc voting to make race-
conscious line drawing still necessary.
Finally, the two forms of strict scrutiny are quite different in terms of how
they balance burdens on minorities and non-minorities. As noted earlier, when
the Court determines if a remedial affirmative action plan is narrowly tailored,
it explicitly takes into account “the impact of the relief on the rights of third
parties.”  This balancing of interests was a crucial factor in Wygant, where93
the Court struck down a remedial affirmative action plan that would have
resulted in the school board laying off senior non-minority teachers while
retaining less senior minority teachers. The decision relied largely upon the
fact that layoffs imposed too great a burden upon the non-minority teachers:
While hiring goals impose a diffuse burden, often foreclosing only one of several
opportunities, layoffs impose the entire burden of achieving racial equality on
particular individuals, often resulting in serious disruption of their lives. That burden
is too intrusive. We therefore hold that, as a means of accomplishing purposes that
otherwise may be legitimate, the Board’s layoff plan is not sufficiently narrowly
tailored. Other, less intrusive means of accomplishing similar purposes—such as the
adoption of hiring goals—are available. For these reasons, the Board’s selection of
layoffs as the means to accomplish even a valid purpose cannot satisfy the demands
of the Equal Protection Clause.94
Crucially, the Court made clear that it was weighing the burden on the
individual non-minority teachers, not the burden on whites as a group. The
Board of Education had argued that since the predominantly white union had
approved the plan, the laid off teachers had effectively waived their right to
argue that race-conscious layoffs violated their right to equal protection. The
Court rejected this argument, emphasizing that the issue is not how a plan
affects whites, or any other race as a group, but how it affects the particular
individuals in question:
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Of course, when a State implements a race-based plan that requires such a sharing
of the burden, it cannot justify the discriminatory effect on some individuals because
other individuals had approved the plan. Any “waiver” of the right not to be dealt
with by the government on the basis of one’s race must be made by those affected.
Yet Justice Marshall repeatedly contends that the fact that Article XII was approved
by a majority vote of the Union somehow validates this plan. He sees this case not
in terms of individual constitutional rights, but as an allocation of burdens “between
two racial groups.” Post, at 309. Thus, Article XII becomes a political compromise
that “avoided placing the entire burden of layoffs on either the white teachers as a
group or the minority teachers as a group.” Post, at 299. But the petitioners before
us today are not “the white teachers as a group.” They are Wendy Wygant and other
individuals who claim that they were fired from their jobs because of their race.95
Thus, there is a significant difference between these two types of strict
scrutiny when it comes to evaluating the burden on non-minority plaintiffs.
For racial redistricting, the Court focuses on the burden on whites as a whole,
and looks for evidence of group harm. For remedial affirmative action, the
Court focuses on the burden of the individual plaintiffs. For whites who see
themselves as marginalized by other whites as a result of such factors as a lack
of seniority or membership in a minority religion, this is a major difference.
To be sure, none of this means that scrutiny in racial redistricting cases
is always less strict than scrutiny in remedial affirmative action cases. The
“narrow tailoring” element can be quite strict in redistricting cases. As noted
earlier, the Court has repeatedly rejected redistricting plans because they
violated tradition districting principles and/or were not reasonably compact
or regular. However, once again we see how different these two forms of strict
scrutiny are. The narrow tailoring elements of redistricting—compactness,
regularity, and traditional districting principles—are completely irrelevant to
remedial affirmative action programs. Thus, the two tests for “narrow
tailoring” have little overlap or commonality.
D. Remedial Affirmative Action and Strict Scrutiny
In sum, these two “strict scrutiny” tests applied by the Court, while
sharing a few common features, have far more differences than similarities.
The only way to say that the constitutional tests in both racial redistricting and
remedial affirmative action are the same would be to describe the tests at the
most general and abstract level. In both types of cases the Court has to decide
if it is going to apply a more rigorous test to a challenged government action;
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in both cases, the Court identifies something that it calls a compelling
governmental interest; in both types of cases, the Court uses a set of factors
that ostensibly test whether the program is narrowly tailored.
However, once we look at the substance of the two types of strict
scrutiny, it is evident that they are not the same test at all, and in fact, differ
in most major respects. As we have seen:
—any use of race in a remedial affirmative action program triggers an
enhanced form of scrutiny, while only the predominant use of race in
redistricting triggers an enhanced form of scrutiny;
—in remedial affirmative action, the harm to minorities must be
intentional in order to be compelling, while, in redistricting cases,
avoiding retrogression of minority voting power is solely a matter of
impact;
—remedial affirmative action plans must have strict durational limits to
pass muster, while race-conscious districting plans need not have any
such limits;
—remedial affirmative action plans are unconstitutional unless there is
a strong basis in evidence that a race-conscious plan is necessary and the
government must explicitly consider race-neutral alternatives, while this
is not true of racial redistricting plans; and,
—for racial redistricting plans the Court looks at burdens only at a racial
group level, while the Court looks at the burdens on the individual
plaintiffs in remedial affirmative action cases.
In fact, the Wygant case shows how irrelevant abstract constructs such as
“narrow tailoring” are to how the Supreme Court actually decides racial
cases.  Recall that the Wygant Court struck down a race based layoff plan96
because it believed that it is a greater burden to be laid off from a job you
already have than it is to be denied a job that you are merely applying for.97
This may be so, but it has nothing to do with whether the plan was narrowly
tailored to reversing the effects of the alleged discrimination. Just the
opposite, a race based layoff plan is more narrowly tailored than a race based
hiring plan such as the one approved in Paradise.  After all, there are always98
possible alternatives to race-based hiring as a way to increase the number of
minority employees. However, in Wygant, since the minority teachers were
almost all among the less senior teachers, sparing minority teachers from
26 UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH LAW REVIEW [Vol. 72:1
99. Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267 (1986).
100. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
101. For example, Bakke’s Quantitative MCAT score was in the 94th percentile, compared to an
average score in the 24th percentile for the students admitted under the special program. His GPA was 3.44
compared to an average GPA of 2.62 for the students admitted under the special program. Id. at 277 n.7.
layoffs was the only possible way for the school board to accomplish its
goal.  This is not to say that the Court was wrong to take the burden on the99
white teachers into account, but it has nothing to do with whether the plan was
narrowly tailored to reversing the effects of alleged discrimination.
Thus, it can be seen that the two strict scrutiny tests have little substance
in common and share only some vague and not particularly descriptive
adjectives. This is most likely a result of the fact that they were developed to
address two very different policy issues. Perhaps even more surprising is that
the strict scrutiny test for remedial affirmative action programs also has very
little in common with the strict scrutiny test the Court applies to diversity-
based affirmative action plans. While the former test is extremely strict, the
latter is much less so. Indeed, with two important exceptions, so-called strict
scrutiny of diversity-based affirmative action programs is so comparatively
permissive that it is best described as less strict than what the Court calls
“intermediate scrutiny” and, for the most part, is hardly any stricter than the
highly deferential “rational basis” test. This is taken up in the next section.
IV. DIVERSITY-BASED AFFIRMATIVE ACTION
While remedial affirmative action is intended to remedy past and present
wrongs, diversity-based affirmative action is oriented towards the future. It is
intended to help future graduates develop a broader understanding of the
diverse world in which they live. The Court first held that student body
diversity is a compelling governmental interest for public universities in
Regents of the University of California v. Bakke,  in 1978. The University100
of California Davis Medical School had set aside 16 of 100 seats for “Black,”
“Chicano,” “Asian,” and “American Indian” applicants. It was sued by a
rejected white applicant, Allan Bakke, who had far higher grades and tests
scores than the averages for the students who were admitted under the set-
aside program.101
The Court was deeply fractured but issued what appeared to be a majority
ruling written by Justice Louis Powell. It was joined in some parts by four
justices, and in other parts, by the four other justices. The opinion set out three
key rulings. First, it held that strict scrutiny applies to affirmative action
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programs, just as it applies to laws that discriminate against racial
minorities.  Second, it rejected many of the government interests put forward102
for the program, such as compensating for historic discrimination, but it held
that achieving student diversity is a compelling governmental interest with
important first amendment implications.  Finally, the Court held that an103
affirmative action program is narrowly tailored to achieve diversity if the
program allows for individual consideration of each applicant, with race or
ethnicity serving as a “plus” factor. Said the Court, “race or ethnic background
may be deemed a ‘plus’ in a particular applicant’s file, yet it [should] not
insulate the individual from comparison with all other candidates for the
available seats.”104
Owing to the fractured nature of the opinion, there was some question
about its status as binding precedent.  Until it decided a pair of cases in105
2003, the Supreme Court had not provided further guidance on the issue of
diversity-based affirmative action for 25 years. In Gratz v. Bollinger and
Grutter v. Bollinger, the Court heard challenges to the affirmative action
programs of, respectively, the University of Michigan’s College of Literature,
Science, and the Arts (LSA) and The University of Michigan Law School.106
In these cases, the Court affirmed that Justice Powell’s opinion in Bakke,
despite its fractured nature, was controlling precedent. In Gratz, the Court
struck down the LSA’s program, which evaluated students on a point system
and admitted all students with 100 or more points.  Pursuant to the LSA’s107
affirmative action program, the school automatically awarded 20 points to any
applicant who was a member of “an underrepresented minority group.” The
Court held that the advantage conferred by the extra points was so great that
“the LSA’s automatic distribution of 20 points has the effect of making ‘the
factor of race . . . decisive’ for virtually every minimally qualified
underrepresented minority.”108
As will be discussed below, it was not simply the size of the racial/ethnic
“plus” that ran afoul of the Court’s analysis. Of at least equal importance, was
the fact that the LSA’s program capped the number of points awarded for
having various talents well below the number of points awarded for being an
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underrepresented minority. “Even if [a student’s] ‘extraordinary artistic talent’
rivaled that of Monet or Picasso, the applicant would receive, at most, five
points under the LSA system.”109
However, in the Grutter case, the Court upheld the law school’s
affirmative action program. Since the Bakke and Gratz decisions struck down
the programs under review, Grutter remains the leading Supreme Court
decision clarifying what sort of diversity-based affirmative action program is
constitutionally acceptable under the strict scrutiny standard.
Unlike the LSA program, the law school program did not use a point
system. It “require[d] admissions officials to evaluate each applicant based on
all the information available in the file . . . .”  The admissions director110
frequently reviewed the “daily reports,” which tracked the racial and ethnic
composition of the class. The stated goal of the law school was to ensure that
members of certain minority groups—African Americans, Chicana/os and
Native Americans—were admitted in sufficient numbers as to constitute a
“critical mass,” i.e. a group large enough that the law school could “realize the
educational benefits of a diverse student body.”111
A crucial factor for the Grutter Court was that the goal of a “critical
mass,” although inherently imprecise, is directly tied to the government’s
compelling interest in diversity. Since that interest is rooted in the First
Amendment value of truly diverse class room discussion, the idea that groups
must be present in a critical mass to effectively participate in that discussion
forms a meaningful nexus between the law school’s affirmative action
program and the First Amendment. Said the majority, “The Law School’s
interest is not simply ‘to assure within its student body some specified
percentage of a particular group . . . . Rather, the Law School’s concept of a
critical mass is defined by reference to the educational benefits that diversity
is designed to produce.”112
The student challenging the affirmative action plan, Barbara Grutter,
argued that achieving a critical mass of certain minorities required the law
school to give those minorities a very large advantage in gaining admission.
Her expert testified that “membership in certain minority groups ‘is an
extremely strong factor in the decision for acceptance.’”  The law school did113
not dispute this. In fact, the law school’s expert testified that “a race-blind
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admissions system would have a ‘very dramatic’ negative effect on
underrepresented minority admissions.”  However, the Grutter Court upheld114
the admissions plan, focusing not on how strong a factor race or ethnicity is,
but rather on whether every applicant, minority or non-minority, got an
individualized review that took into account his or her own merits:
Here, the Law School engages in a highly individualized, holistic review of each
applicant’s file, giving serious consideration to all the ways an applicant might
contribute to a diverse educational environment. The Law School affords this
individualized consideration to applicants of all races. There is no policy, either de
jure or de facto, of automatic acceptance or rejection based on any single “soft”
variable. Unlike the program at issue in Gratz v. Bollinger, ante, p. 244, the Law
School awards no mechanical, predetermined diversity “bonuses” based on race or
ethnicity.115
In fact, we will see below that it is only a slight exaggeration to say that
the factor of “individualized consideration,” along with connecting the
admissions goals to the First Amendment benefits that diversity is supposed
to promote, are really the only issues of importance in diversity-based
affirmative action cases. While the Grutter Court mentioned the various
factors it applied in remedial affirmative action cases, and repeatedly cited
those cases, it was so deferential in how it scrutinized these factors that the
level of review it applied was far closer to rational basis review than it was to
strict scrutiny. The following sections compare the strict scrutiny tests in
remedial and diversity-based affirmative action cases.
A. Should Strict Scrutiny Apply?
Despite huge differences, there are of course some similarities between
how the Court applies strict scrutiny in the two types of affirmative action
cases. This analysis begins with the most significant similarity. In both areas,
the Court subjects government affirmative action policies to a test labeled as
strict scrutiny regardless of whether the use of race is “predominant.” For
example, in the seminal case of Grutter v. Bollinger, the plaintiff’s own expert
witness conceded “that race is not the predominant factor in the Law School’s
admissions calculus.”  Nonetheless, the Court applied strict scrutiny, stating116
“when governmental decisions ‘touch upon an individual’s race or ethnic
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background, he is entitled to a judicial determination that the burden he is
asked to bear on that basis is precisely tailored to serve a compelling
governmental interest.’”117
Thus, in contrast to case law in the racial redistricting cases, the Court
applies strict scrutiny to both remedial and diversity-based affirmative action
programs even when the use of race is not predominant. As we will see in the
next two sections, this is where the similarities, for the most part, end.
B. Compelling Governmental Interest
To begin with a brief statement of the obvious, the compelling
governmental interests in the two types of affirmative action are different. The
interest in remedial affirmative action is rectifying specific governmental
discrimination. In diversity-based affirmative action, the compelling interest
is in diversity regardless of any intentional discrimination.
This is a straightforward result of the different contexts that give rise to
these cases. However, there is a less overt, far more significant difference in
these two forms of strict scrutiny that goes to the very heart of what strict
scrutiny is supposed to accomplish. In both remedial and diversity-based
affirmative action cases, the Court has repeatedly stated that the reason d’etre
of strict scrutiny is to “‘smoke out’ illegitimate uses of race.”  “Absent118
searching judicial inquiry into the justification for such race-based measures
we have no way to determine what classifications are ‘benign’ or ‘remedial’
and what ‘classifications are in fact motivated by illegitimate notions of racial
inferiority or simple racial politics.’”119
In the remedial affirmative action cases, this attempt to smoke out
illegitimate uses of race is a genuinely central focus of strict scrutiny review.
For example in Croson, in which the City of Richmond required 30% of
subcontracting dollars to go to “Minority Business Enterprises,” the district
court had found that the city’s purpose was indeed to rectify past and present
discrimination. The district court based this on five findings of fact:
1) the ordinance declares itself to be remedial; (2) several proponents of the measure
stated their views that there had been past discrimination in the construction
industry; (3) minority businesses received 0.67% of prime contracts from the city
while minorities constituted 50% of the city’s population; (4) there were very few
minority contractors in local and state contractors’ associations; and (5) in 1977,
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Congress made a determination that the effects of past discrimination had stifled
minority participation in the construction industry nationally.120
Despite these lower court findings, the Supreme Court refused to defer to
Richmond’s explanation of the program’s purpose or to the district court’s
conclusions that Richmond’s intent was benign and remedial. Instead, the
Justices took their own independent and exacting examination of Richmond’s
purported reasons for the program. The majority noted that “the city has not
ascertained how many minority enterprises are present in the local
construction market, nor the level of their participation in city construction
projects.”  The Justices added that “[t]he city points to no evidence that121
qualified minority contractors have been passed over for city contracts or
subcontracts . . . .”122
As a result, the Court held that it was at least possible that the affirmative
action program was really a result of illegitimate motives, whether conscious
or subconscious: “Absent such findings, there is a danger that a racial
classification is merely the product of unthinking stereotypes or a form of
racial politics.”123
Finally, the Court took a hard look at what racial groups were and were
not included in the program:
The foregoing analysis applies only to the inclusion of blacks within the Richmond
set-aside program. There is absolutely no evidence of past discrimination against
Spanish-speaking, Oriental, Indian, Eskimo, or Aleut persons in any aspect of the
Richmond construction industry. . . . If a 30% set-aside was “narrowly tailored” to
compensate black contractors for past discrimination, one may legitimately ask why
they are forced to share this “remedial relief” with an Aleut citizen who moves to
Richmond tomorrow? The gross overinclusiveness of Richmond’s racial preference
strongly impugns the city’s claim of remedial motivation.124
Thus, in the remedial context, the Court uses strict scrutiny as tool to
verify that the purpose of the government program is genuinely benign and to
smoke out unthinking stereotypes or racial politics. This examination includes
a judicial inquiry into the question of what racial groups are included in the
program.
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The contrast with diversity-based affirmative action could not be greater.
In Grutter, the Court granted virtually complete deference to The University
of Michigan Law School’s claim that its sole purpose was to ensure that a
“critical mass” of underrepresented minorities was enrolled in each entering
class. Rather than scrutinizing this crucial claim, the Court held that as an
institution of higher learning, the law school was entitled to deference: “The
Law School’s educational judgment that such diversity is essential to its
educational mission is one to which we defer. . . . Our holding today is in
keeping with our tradition of giving a degree of deference to a university’s
academic decisions, within constitutionally prescribed limits.”  The125
presumption of a university’s good faith was also central to the Court’s
holding in Bakke:
a court would not assume that a university, professing to employ a facially
nondiscriminatory admissions policy, would operate it as a cover for the functional
equivalent of a quota system. In short, good faith would be presumed in the absence
of a showing to the contrary in the manner permitted by our cases.126
In fact, the Grutter Court went well beyond granting “a degree of
deference.” In sharp contrast to Croson, the Court held that it would simply
assume that the law school was giving a truthful account of the affirmative
action program’s purpose:
Our conclusion that the Law School has a compelling interest in a diverse student
body is informed by our view that attaining a diverse student body is at the heart of
the Law School’s proper institutional mission, and that “good faith” on the part of
a university is “presumed” absent a “showing to the contrary.”127
The magnitude of the Court’s deference becomes even more apparent
when one considers the fact that there were reasonable bases for fearing that
“unthinking stereotypes” and/or “racial politics” could indeed have been at
least part of the law school’s motivation in designing the affirmative action
program. One red flag is the complete exclusion of Asian Americans from the
program, including those from under-represented ethnicities.
The stated purpose of the law school’s program was to increase
enrollment of students “from groups which have been historically
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discriminated against.”  The law school conceded that Asian Americans128
were a group that had been historically discriminated against but averred that
Asian Americans were left out of the program anyway because they “were
already being admitted to the Law School in significant numbers.”  As a129
result, Asian Americans face a much higher hurdle for admission than do
African Americans or Latino/a applicants.130
The Court let the issue of excluding Asian Americans pass without
further examination, but had it applied anything like the level of scrutiny it
applied in Croson, the law school would have had great difficulty defending
this exclusion. While there is a tendency to speak of Asian Americans
monolithically as a highly successful “model minority,” there are many
different ethnicities of Asian Americans, quite a few of whom suffer from
great disadvantages and are unlikely to be admitted to the law school in
significant numbers.  While some ethnicities, such as Chinese and Japanese131
Americans, have impressive rates of educational achievement, other
ethnicities, such as Cambodian, Hmong, and Laotian Americans, are severely
underrepresented in higher education. For example only 0.4% of Cambodian,
Hmong, and Laotian Americans hold advanced degrees, which is only one-
third the percentage of African Americans with such degrees and only one-
quarter the percentage of Latina/os with such degrees.132
Therefore, the Grutter Court certainly had reason to fear that “unthinking
stereotypes” or “racial politics” was at play in the law school’s blanket
exclusion of Asian Americans from the affirmative action program. A possible
stereotype would be to view Asian Americans monolithically and see no need
for the voices of underrepresented Asian ethnicities when there are ample
numbers of Chinese and Japanese American students already being admitted.
The possibility of “racial politics” is even more disturbing. Many Asian
Americans fear, often with reason, that they might be affirmatively
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unwelcome at elite educational institutions, at least in large numbers. For
example, as this article was being written, the United States Department of
Education was “tak[ing] a broad look at Princeton’s admission policies to
determine whether discrimination against Asians was involved.”  Further,133
there is a long history of educational discrimination against Asian
Americans.134
This is not to assert that the law school was actually motivated by either
unthinking stereotypes or racial politics. What we see, though, is that in
diversity-based affirmative action cases, the level of scrutiny is far lower than
in remedial affirmative action cases due to the deep deference the Court grants
in the diversity cases. If it were indeed true that anti-Asian stereotypes or
animus were at play in the law school’s policies, there is nothing in the
Grutter Court’s analysis that would have smoked this out, even though
smoking out these sorts of invidious factors is supposed to be the very reason
for applying strict scrutiny in the first place.
One measure of the deferential scrutiny applied by the Grutter Court is
how it compares to the scrutiny employed by the Court in a gender
discrimination case, United States v. Virginia.  In that case, the Virginia135
Military Institute (VMI), a public university, had a male-only admission
policy. It proffered two reasons for the policy. It claimed that single-sex
education was essential to its particular method of education and it also argued
that since all other Virginia public universities were coed, it was enhancing
the State’s educational diversity by offering a single sex option.136
Since the issue in the case was gender discrimination, it is hornbook law
that the Court must apply “intermediate” or “heightened” scrutiny, which is
intended to be less rigorous than strict scrutiny.  Therefore, one would137
expect that the Court would grant at least as much deference to VMI as it did
to the University of Michigan Law School and would presume VMI’s good
faith as it did in Grutter. To the contrary, the Court flatly stated that it would
not presume VMI’s good faith and that it would look at the historical record
not only of VMI, but of elite universities generally. The Court rejected VMI’s
proffered explanations:
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Single-sex education affords pedagogical benefits to at least some students, Virginia
emphasizes, and that reality is uncontested in this litigation. Similarly, it is not
disputed that diversity among public educational institutions can serve the public
good. But Virginia has not shown that VMI was established, or has been maintained,
with a view to diversifying, by its categorical exclusion of women, educational
opportunities within the Commonwealth. In cases of this genre, our precedent
instructs that “benign” justifications proffered in defense of categorical exclusions
will not be accepted automatically; a tenable justification must describe actual state
purposes, not rationalizations for actions in fact differently grounded. . . . Neither
recent nor distant history bears out Virginia’s alleged pursuit of diversity through
single-sex educational options. In 1839, when the Commonwealth established VMI,
a range of educational opportunities for men and women was scarcely contemplated.
Higher education at the time was considered dangerous for women; reflecting widely
held views about women’s proper place, the Nation’s first universities and
colleges—for example, Harvard in Massachusetts, William and Mary in
Virginia—admitted only men.138
Based upon its rejection of Virginia’s proffered intentions, the Court held
that VMI lacked an “‘exceedingly persuasive justification’” for its male-only
policy.  In fact, the Court was so nondeferential to VMI that some prominent139
constitutional law scholars argued that the case represented a toughening of
the intermediate scrutiny standard.140
It is startling to juxtapose this skeptical treatment of Virginia’s proffered
interests with the highly deferential treatment accorded to Michigan’s law
school. While it is certainly true that elite schools had a history of
discrimination against women, it is equally true that many of these same
schools also have a history of discrimination against Asian-American
applicants.  While the Grutter Court was applying what is supposed to be the141
strictest form of scrutiny, and the Virginia Court was applying what is
supposed to be a more lenient form of scrutiny, we can see that the opposite
is true. Not only is the level of scrutiny applied in Grutter less strict than it
was in any of the Court’s remedial affirmative action cases, it is actually less
strict than so-called “intermediate scrutiny.” Indeed, it will be argued below
that the most important distinction in diversity cases is not race versus gender,
but rather “individual consideration” versus “categorical exclusion.” Because
VMI completely excluded women, this triggered a very high level of scrutiny;
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because the University of Michigan Law School gave individual consideration
to every candidate, this triggered a far more deferential level of scrutiny. This
will be discussed at the end of the next section.
In sum, the “compelling interest” prong of the strict scrutiny test is
applied very differently in the two types of affirmative action cases. In
remedial affirmative action cases, the Court undertakes an independent,
searching examination of whether the stated interest is the genuine motivation
for the policy. In racial diversity affirmative action cases, the Court grants
virtually complete deference. These two approaches are so different that it is
not accurate to state that the Court is applying the same level of scrutiny in
both cases.
C. Narrowly Tailored?
As previously discussed, an important part of the narrow tailoring
requirement of strict scrutiny in remedial affirmative action cases is that there
must be clear durational limits. Ostensibly, diversity-based affirmative action
plans should also have a durational limit. The Grutter Court held that “race-
conscious admissions policies must be limited in time.”  As with the142
compelling interest prong of strict scrutiny, the level of judicial deference
regarding this requirement is so great as to be more in line with the Court’s
lowest level of scrutiny, rational basis.
The Grutter Court stated, “[i]n the context of higher education, the
durational requirements can be met by sunset provisions in race-conscious
admissions policies and periodic reviews to determine whether racial
preferences are still necessary to achieve student body diversity.”143
Nonetheless, the Court did not require that the law school’s race-conscious
policies actually have sunset provisions, nor did it even require “periodic
reviews” to determine whether such policies are still necessary. Instead, the
Court flatly stated that it would not scrutinize the duration of the policy at all,
much less do so strictly: “We take the Law School at its word that it would
‘like nothing better than to find a race-neutral admissions formula’ and will
terminate its race-conscious admissions program as soon as practicable.”144
The Court added, “[w]e expect that 25 years from now, the use of racial
preferences will no longer be necessary to further the interest approved
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today.”  However, even this quarter century long time line was phrased as145
an aspiration rather than a requirement.
Similarly, the Court accords a very high degree of deference in
scrutinizing whether an educational institution has considered race-neutral
alternatives. This is, once again, in sharp contrast to the level of scrutiny
employed by the Court in remedial affirmative action cases. In United States
v. Paradise, the Court held that, “[i]n determining whether race-conscious
remedies are appropriate, we look to several factors, including the efficacy of
alternative remedies.”  In Croson, one of the reasons the Court struck down146
the City of Richmond’s remedial affirmative action plan was that “there does
not appear to have been any consideration of the use of race-neutral means to
increase minority business participation in city contracting.”147
In Grutter, the Court was, once again, far more deferential. While the
Court did say “[n]arrow tailoring does, however, require serious, good faith
consideration of workable race-neutral alternatives that will achieve the
diversity the university seeks,”  it required little or no evidence from the law148
school that it actually considered race-neutral alternatives.  The law school149
never produced a witness at trial or during pre-trial proceedings who
purported to describe any actual consideration of race-neutral alternatives.
Nonetheless, the Court of Appeals rejected the district’s court’s finding that
the law school failed to consider race-neutral alternatives. Citing the expertise
of the law school, and the court’s own lack of expertise, the Court of Appeals
held that the law school was entitled to virtually complete deference on this
matter and that the law school should simply be presumed to have considered
race-neutral alternatives in good faith:
[I]n applying strict scrutiny we cannot ignore the educational judgment and expertise
of the Law School’s faculty and admissions personnel regarding the efficacy of race-
neutral alternatives. We are ill-equipped to ascertain which race-neutral alternatives
merit which degree of consideration or which alternatives will allow an institution
such as the Law School to assemble both a highly qualified and richly diverse
academic class. . . . Mindful of both our constitutional obligations and our practical
limitations, we also assume—along the lines suggested by Justice Powell—that the
Law School acts in good faith in exercising its educational judgment and expertise.150
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The Supreme Court upheld the Court of Appeals stating, as quoted above,
that “[w]e take the Law School at its word that it would ‘like nothing better
than to find a race-neutral admissions formula’ . . . .”  The Court made no151
mention of the law school’s lack of evidence that it actually considered race-
neutral alternatives. The Court discussed the lack of feasibility of the law
school’s achieving diversity by lowering admissions standards or by using a
“percentage plan” that was designed for colleges, not graduate programs.
However, it made no inquiry into whether the law school had actually
considered such commonly mentioned race-neutral alternatives as economic
or class-based affirmative action.  In contrast, the Croson Court took the152
City of Richmond to task for not having considered whether increased
economic aid might be a race-neutral way to increase minority participation:
“If [Minority Business Enterprises] disproportionately lack capital or cannot
meet bonding requirements, a race-neutral program of city financing for small
firms would, a fortiori, lead to greater minority participation.”  The Grutter153
Court made no equivalent suggestion, such as the law school considering
increased financial aid to diversify its student body. The deference of the
Court is particularly striking given the fact that various other elite law schools
have had success diversifying their classes utilizing race-neutral programs
such as UCLA’s “Critical Race Studies” program that is open to all students
regardless of race.154
D. Diversity-Based Affirmative Action and Strict Scrutiny
In sum, the scrutiny the Court applies to diversity-based affirmative
action programs is quite different from the scrutiny it applies to remedial
affirmative action programs. The Court’s scrutiny of remedial affirmative
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action plans is actually quite strict regarding the issues of whether there is a
compelling governmental interest for such a program, whether the program
has durational limits, and whether there was genuine consideration of race-
neutral alternatives. For diversity-based affirmative action, the Court’s highly
deferential approach is so different as to make it clear that these are not the
same tests at all.
For diversity cases, the only two factors that are actually subjected to
serious scrutiny are: whether the racial and ethnic goals of the educational
institution are based upon the First Amendment benefits of diversity and
whether every student receives individual consideration. The Court has
particularly emphasized this second factor and repeated it over and over again
in Gratz and Grutter. In a two page stretch, the Gratz opinion uses some
variant of the word “automatic” or notes the lack of individual consideration
nine different times.  Similarly, in a single page, the Grutter opinion states155
that:
The importance of individualized consideration . . . is paramount”; “the Law School
engages in a highly individualized, holistic review of each applicant’s file . . .”; “the
Law School awards no predetermined, mechanical diversity ‘bonuses’ based on race
or ethnicity”; “the Law School’s admissions policy ‘is flexible enough to consider
all pertinent elements of diversity in light of the particular qualifications of each
applicant’ . . .”; and “the Law School’s race-conscious admissions program
adequately ensures that all factors that may contribute to student body diversity are
meaningfully considered alongside race in admissions decisions.156
Thus, to the degree that the Court’s scrutiny of such programs can be
labeled as strict, that strictness is based upon two criteria: 1) there must be a
nexus between the racial/ethnic goals and their First Amendment benefit; 2)
there must be individual consideration of every application. This two part test
has almost nothing in common with the Court’s test in remedial affirmative
action cases.
In fact, in many ways, the two tests are polar opposites. While remedial
affirmative action cases are far stricter in all the ways discussed above, their
level of scrutiny is actually quite lenient in terms of requiring individual
consideration. If the Court is satisfied that all of its conditions are met—a
strong basis in evidence that governmental discrimination has occurred,
durational limits, etc.—the Court tolerates just the sort of automatic
preferences that it rejects in diversity cases. Recall that in Local 28, the Court
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upheld a 29% nonwhite membership goal and in Paradise, the Court upheld
a lower court order enjoining the Alabama Department of Public Safety to hire
one African-American trooper for each white trooper hired until African
Americans constituted approximately 25% of the State trooper force.  So in157
Paradise, for example, if the State were hiring 10 new troopers and had
already hired five white applicants, even a highly qualified white applicant
would be rejected purely on the basis of his or her race as long as there were
five qualified African-American applicants.  Such a result would be158
anathema under the version of strict scrutiny applied in Bakke and Grutter.
So far, the Court has only decided one remedial affirmative action case
since Croson: the Adarand case in 1995. In that case, the Court clarified that
the Croson standards applied to the federal government as well as State
governments and remanded the case to the district court with explicit
instructions to apply those standards.  The Supreme Court directed the lower159
Court to determine “whether there was ‘any consideration of the use of race-
neutral means to increase minority participation’ in government contracting
. . . or whether the program was appropriately limited such that it ‘will not last
longer than the discriminatory effects it is designed to eliminate.’”  The160
Supreme Court also ordered a more stringent review of “which socially
disadvantaged individuals qualify as economically disadvantaged . . . .”161
Therefore, it certainly appears that Croson is the leading case on remedial
affirmative action.
Croson’s role, as the controlling standard, was reemphasized by the Court
in 2009, although not in an equal protection case. The Court not only cited
Croson favorably in its decision on racial disparate impact in Ricci v.
Destafano, but it actually borrowed the “strong basis in evidence” language
from Croson (as well as from Wygant) and used it to resolve a dispute arising
under Title VII.  In that case, a group of mostly white firefighters sued the162
city of New Haven for setting aside the results of a promotion exam on which
African-American firefighters performed poorly. The Supreme Court declined
to rule on the Equal Protection claims but borrowed from its remedial
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affirmative action jurisprudence to resolve the case. The Court noted that the
standards for race-conscious action under Title VII were not necessarily the
same as the constitutional standard. Nonetheless, it applied the rule from
Croson that race-based affirmative action is constitutional only if there is a
strong basis of evidence that it is necessary to rectify past or present
discrimination. Based upon this standard, the Court held that New Haven was
not allowed to set the test results aside unless it had a strong basis in evidence
that such a remedial action was necessary to avoid liability under Title VII.
Similarly, the one diversity-based affirmative action case decided by the
Court since Gratz and Grutter, is a remarkably straightforward application of
those cases. Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District
No. 1,  involved a challenge to the Seattle School and Jefferson County163
School Districts’ plans to maintain diversity in their schools. The Seattle plan
allowed students to rank order their preference for high schools in the district.
If a school was oversubscribed and its racial makeup was not within 10
percentage points of the district’s overall white/non-white balance, the
available slots would go to students whose race would bring the school closer
to that balance. The district was 41% white, so the goal was for each school
to be no less than 31% white and no greater than 51% white. The Jefferson
County plan required all non-magnet schools to maintain an African-American
enrollment of between 15% and 50%.
The Court struck down both plans, provoking a number of major
journalists to claim that the Court was changing the rules for evaluating
diversity-based affirmative action plans. For example, The New Yorker
charged that “the Court issued a decision, written by Chief Justice John
Roberts that signaled a complete departure from more than half a century of
jurisprudence on race.”  The New York Times’ eminent Supreme Court164
reporter Linda Greenhouse argued that the decision was a reversal of the
Court’s approach in Grutter.  Interestingly, the Court itself averred that165
“[t]he present cases are not governed by Grutter” because they involved K-12
schools rather than institutions of higher learning.
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All this reveals the very high level of confusion, including the Court’s
own, about how the Court really applies strict scrutiny to student diversity
cases. Whatever Parents Involved’s other complexities may be, it is a
straightforward application of the Bakke/Grutter version of the strict scrutiny
test.
The Court noted that because Seattle had never been under a
desegregation order and, because Jefferson County’s desegregation order had
been dissolved, the only compelling interest the districts could rely upon was
student diversity.  As we have now seen, strict scrutiny in diversity cases166
amounts to a two prong test. First, is there a nexus between the racial/ethnic
goals and the educational/First Amendment interest in a diverse dialogue and
educational experience? Second, does every student get individual
consideration? The school districts’ plans failed both prongs. Regarding the
first prong, the Court stated: “The plans are tied to each district’s specific
racial demographics, rather than to any pedagogic concept of the level of
diversity needed to obtain the asserted educational benefits.”  This flaw167
would be fatal under the diversity version of the strict scrutiny test because the
goals must be tailored to the educational/First Amendment benefits sought.
The Court continued:
The districts offer no evidence that the level of racial diversity necessary to achieve
the asserted educational benefits happens to coincide with the racial demographics
of the respective school districts—or rather the white/nonwhite or black/“other”
balance of the districts, since that is the only diversity addressed by the plans.168
The districts’ plans failed the second prong as well, which requires that
every student have an opportunity to be evaluated on his or her own merits.
The fate of the Seattle plan was sealed when the Court described the operation
of the plan with the following example:
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Petitioner Parents Involved in Community Schools (Parents Involved) is a nonprofit
corporation comprising the parents of children who have been or may be denied
assignment to their chosen high school in the district because of their race. The
concerns of Parents Involved are illustrated by Jill Kurfirst, who sought to enroll her
ninth-grade son, Andy Meeks, in Ballard High School’s special Biotechnology
Career Academy. Andy suffered from attention deficit hyperactivity disorder and
dyslexia, but had made good progress with hands-on instruction, and his mother and
middle school teachers thought that the smaller biotechnology program held the most
promise for his continued success. Andy was accepted into this selective program
but, because of the racial tiebreaker, was denied assignment to Ballard High
School.169
Since Andy Meeks had no opportunity to have his case individually
reviewed and was denied access to the program solely because of his race, this
is clear violation of the second prong of the Court’s strict scrutiny test. The
Court used a similar example to explain the workings of the Jefferson County
plan:
When petitioner Crystal Meredith moved into the school district in August 2002, she
sought to enroll her son, Joshua McDonald, in kindergarten for the 2002-2003
school year. His resides school was only a mile from his new home, but it had no
available space—assignments had been made in May, and the class was full.
Jefferson County assigned Joshua to another elementary school in his cluster, Young
Elementary. This school was 10 miles from home, and Meredith sought to transfer
Joshua to a school in a different cluster, Bloom Elementary, which—like his resides
school—was only a mile from home. See Tr. in McFarland I, pp. 1–49 through 1–54
(Dec. 8, 2003). Space was available at Bloom, and intercluster transfers are allowed,
but Joshua’s transfer was nonetheless denied because, in the words of Jefferson
County, “[t]he transfer would have an adverse effect on desegregation compliance”
of Young.170
As with Andy Meeks in Seattle, Joshua McDonald had no opportunity for
individual review. He was denied admittance to the closer school solely
because of his race. Therefore, both plans clearly violated the second prong
of diversity strict scrutiny as well as the first prong. Whatever the policy
merits of the plans were, both plans were unconstitutional under both prongs
of the actual strict scrutiny test that has emerged from Bakke, Gratz, and
Grutter.
Understanding the two prong test also makes it easier to understand the
Court’s striking down of the Virginia Military Institute’s (VMI) male-only
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admission policy in the Virginia case. As discussed above, despite the
ostensible rule that gender discrimination is subject to a lower form of
scrutiny than is race discrimination, the Court subjected VMI’s professed
reasons for its admissions policies to significantly stricter scrutiny than it did
to the University of Michigan Law School’s reasons. While a full exploration
is beyond the scope of this article, these two cases suggest that the
conventional view that race is subject to strict scrutiny while gender is subject
to intermediate scrutiny might be at least partially outdated. These two cases
are best explained by the fact that the law school gave every applicant an
individual review while VMI did not. The race/gender dichotomy, at least in
the context of diversity cases, may no longer be as relevant as it once was.
V. SAME NAME, DIFFERENT TESTS
Contrary to the conventional wisdom, there is no unitary strict scrutiny
test for racial equal protection any more than there is a unitary First
Amendment test. Just as the Court applies different tests to obscenity, libel,
fighting words and other free speech cases, it applies different tests to racial
redistricting, remedial affirmative action, and diversity-based affirmative
action cases. To summarize, these tests are as follows:
Racial
Redistricting
Remedial
Affirmative
Action
Diversity-Based
Affirmative
Action
Apply Strict
Scrutiny?
Only if race is
predominant
Any use of race Any use of race
Compelling
Interest
For minority
retrogression,
avoiding adverse
impact is
compelling
regardless of
whether there is
intentional
discrimination.
Only combating
firmly proven,
intentional
discrimination is
compelling.
The issue of
discrimination is
irrelevant. The
issue is the
educational
benefit of
diversity.
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Racial
Redistricting
Remedial
Affirmative
Action
Diversity-Based
Affirmative
Action
Narrow Tailoring Race must not be
predominant—
Court looks to
compactness and
respect for
traditional
apportionment
criteria.
Issues of
duration,
consideration of
race-neutral
alternatives are
not relevant.
Burden on
non-minorities is
measured at the
group level.
There must be
strict durational
limits.
There must be
genuine
consideration of
race-neutral
alternatives and a
showing that a
race-conscious
remedy is
necessary to
rectify the
discrimination.
Benefits of the
race-conscious
program must be
measured against
the burden on
individual
non-minorities.
Burden is
measured by
impact; there is
no need to prove
or allege stigma
or animus against
non-minorities.
The Court
scrutinizes which
racial/ethnic
groups benefit
from the
race-conscious
policies.
There must be a
clear nexus
between the
race-conscious
goals and the
educational
benefits of
diversity.
Every applicant
must receive
genuinely
individual
consideration
with no seats or
spaces excluded.
The Court applies
rational basis
level deference
on other
questions.
VI. IMPLICATIONS
What is the significance of our findings? In what ways does the myth of
a unitary strict scrutiny test impact the outcome of cases and fields of law? As
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we will show, confusion over how the Court actually applies strict scrutiny
undermines the efficacy of the courts in addressing contemporary issues of
equal protection. For example, one area where the Court has greatly struggled
is equal rights for gay men and lesbians. The Court has been unwilling to
apply strict scrutiny to discrimination against homosexuals for fear that
applying strict scrutiny to any one area of constitutional rights for lesbians and
gay men would force the Court to also apply strict scrutiny to other areas such
as same-sex marriage. Because the Court is apparently not ready to do that, it
has gone to great lengths to avoid applying strict scrutiny to gay men and
lesbians even when its own jurisprudence would seem to require
application.  The next section will address another important area where the171
myth of a unitary strict scrutiny test has prevented the Court from adequately
developing equal protection doctrine—that of racial profiling by the
government.
A. Racial Profiling
One consequence of the confusion over strict scrutiny is that it has
completely impeded the courts from applying the equal protection doctrine to
the important issue of racial profiling. It is difficult to precisely measure how
prevalent racial profiling is in the United States,  but there is no question that172
Americans, especially minority Americans, perceive the practice as common
place. According to a Gallup poll of over 2000 people, including 1001 African
Americans:
A majority of Americans, regardless of race, believe that racial profiling—the
practice of police stopping people, often ethnic or racial minorities, who fit a profile
of a certain type of offender—is widespread in this country . . . . More than four out
of 10 Blacks of all ages and both genders said they believe they’ve been stopped
because of their race.173
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These concerns have been stoked by the courts’ anemic response to this
issue. In one highly publicized case, Brown v. City of Oneonta,  a 77-year-174
old home burglary victim in Oneonta, New York, told police that she had only
seen the hands and arms of the perpetrator. The victim told the police that the
burglar was young and black and had a cut on his hand. The Oneonta police
responded by randomly stopping and questioning over 200 young black
men—virtually every young black man they could find in town. Black male
students at the local university and others who had been stopped and
questioned sued the Oneonta police for civil rights violations.
What is remarkable about this case is not merely that the plaintiffs lost,
but how little protection they received from the equal protection clause. The
Second Circuit held that because the police were “not alleged to have
investigated ‘based solely upon . . . race, without more,’” there was no
“actionable claim under the Equal Protection Clause.”  In short, because the175
police used “not only race, but also gender and age, as well as the possibility
of a cut on the hand,” this was not a racial classification at all, and therefore,
it did not create an equal protection claim.176
The Oneonta decision follows the lead of the Sixth Circuit Court of
Appeals, which has also held that strict scrutiny, indeed any equal protection
scrutiny, is only triggered when the government stops and questions a person
solely on the basis of their race. In United States v. Travis,  the defendant177
claimed that her rights were violated when detectives allegedly questioned her
and searched her bags based upon her race. The Sixth Circuit held that there
is an equal protection claim only when the defendant can “demonstrate by a
‘preponderance of the evidence’ that a police officer decided to approach him
or her solely because of his or her race.”178
The United States Supreme Court had a major opportunity to weigh in on
this issue but declined to do so. In United States. v. Martinez-Fuerte,  the179
Court upheld the practice of the United States Border Patrol, which relied
heavily, but not solely, on apparent Latino ethnicity in determining whom to
send to a secondary inspection area. The Court did not apply the Equal
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Protection Clause at all to this practice, and instead upheld it under a Fourth
Amendment balancing test.
Given the significance of the issue of racial profiling, this is not much
protection. As the constitutional law scholar Albert W. Alschuler has pointed
out, even lynch mobs and other ardent racists did not rely solely on race:
Even in our nation’s shameful old days, only a small minority of blacks were
lynched, and blacks were not alone in being lynched. Lynch mobs considered not
only race but also gender, religion, attitude, and allegations of criminal conduct.
These mobs, however, employed racial classifications. Even old-style racists often
have reasons in addition to race for hating people; we call someone a racist because
race provides one of his reasons for judging other people, not because it provides the
only one.180
The Court’s insistence that there is no equal protection issue unless police
or border profiling is based solely on race makes this area an extreme outlier
in the field of equal protection. As discussed above, affirmative action
policies, be they remedial or diversity-based, trigger strict scrutiny so long as
race is any factor in government-decision making. Additionally, we have seen
that districting triggers strict scrutiny if race is the predominant factor; there
is no requirement that it be the only factor. Given that factors such as
incumbency protection and partisan advantage are important factors in any
redistricting plan, such a requirement would virtually eliminate equal
protection review from the area of redistricting.
Indeed, the Court will apply strict scrutiny even when there is no explicit
use of race at all by the government if the Court believes that race was one
factor in the government’s decision making process. In Arlington Heights v.
Metropolitan Housing Development Corp.,  the plaintiffs argued that the181
city’s refusal to allow development of multiple housing units that would be
affordable to minorities was racially motivated. In response, the Court
explicitly clarified that the Equal Protection Clause “does not require a
plaintiff to prove that the challenged action rested solely on racially
discriminatory purposes. . . . When there is a proof that a discriminatory
purpose has been a motivating factor in the decision,” strict scrutiny is
required.182
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Why then have the courts taken so stingy an approach to applying equal
protection to such a crucial issue as racial profiling? While judicial mind-
reading is always a tricky task, the judges in the Oneonta case offered some
revealing insights into the dynamics of how judges view equal protection and
racial profiling. Police often rely on race in questioning suspects, for example,
either because a victim describes the race of the assailant or because a crime
was committed by a gang with a particular racial makeup. If the courts applied
strict scrutiny to this practice, the fear is that the courts would either
straitjacket the police or, by allowing the practice, dilute strict scrutiny
protection against other forms of discrimination. As Judge Calabresi wrote in
his dissenting opinion in the Oneonta case:
If an action is deemed a racial classification, it is very difficult, under the Supreme
Court precedents, ever to justify it. And, were such justification made easier in cases
of police following a victim’s description, the spillover to other racial classification
contexts would be highly undesirable. In other words, were the requirements of strict
scrutiny to be relaxed in the police/victim’s description area, it would be hard indeed
to keep them from also being weakened in other areas in which racial classifications
ought virtually never to be countenanced.183
In his concurring opinion Chief Judge Walker, made a similar point:
For better or worse, it is a fact of life in our diverse culture that race is used on a
daily basis as a short hand for physical appearance. This is as true in police work as
anywhere else. The theories suggested by the dissenters would require a police
officer, before acting on a physical description that contains a racial element, to
balance myriad competing considerations, one of which would be the risk of being
subject to strict scrutiny in an equal protection lawsuit . . . . In addition to potentially
chilling police protection, and tying up officers in added court proceedings, these
new rules would be implicated in many ordinary police investigations. As a result,
these rules would likely undermine the strict scrutiny standard itself, because
apprehending dangerous criminals in almost all instances would constitute a
compelling state interest. Frequent satisfaction of strict scrutiny as police go about
their daily work of investigating crime would likely have spillover effects into other
areas of equal protection law, diluting the standard’s efficacy where we would want
it to retain its power.184
This line of reasoning, although well-intentioned, is a perfect example of
the costs of the myth that there is single strict scrutiny test. If there is only one
strict scrutiny test and it does not fit neatly in the world of police officers’ use
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of race, then the best choice is to avoid strict scrutiny all together, just as the
courts have done.
It would be far easier for the courts to formulate an appropriate equal
protection analysis of racial profiling if they were clearer about the fact that
the Supreme Court already applies a number of different strict scrutiny tests
to different areas of race discrimination based upon the particulars of each
area. Just as the courts do not have to apply the same form of strict scrutiny
to obscenity as they do to libel or advocacy of illegal action under the First
Amendment, the courts do not have to apply the same strict scrutiny test to
racial profiling that they do to affirmative action or race-based redistricting.
Once the myth of a unitary strict scrutiny test is set aside, the courts can
engage in the crucial project of developing a form of strict scrutiny that is
appropriate for the issue of racial profiling. Such a test could take account of
the legitimate use of race by the police without diluting equal protection in
other areas because it would be a test designed specifically to deal with this
issue.
Just what such a test would look like is beyond the scope of this article
and beyond the expertise of the authors. A form of strict scrutiny to be applied
to racial profiling might distinguish between reliance upon witness
descriptions of specific suspects that include the suspect’s race and reliance
upon statistics about which races most often commit certain crimes. It might
distinguish between racial profiling in specific, highly regulated areas such as
airports or border crossings and racial profiling on ordinary streets and
highways. It might distinguish between profiling based on race and profiling
based upon apparent nationality.
Formulating the best strict scrutiny test for racial profiling will be a
challenging enterprise, but taking on this challenge is far better than
continuing the Courts’ current abdication of responsibility by pretending that
the equal protection clause is irrelevant to racial profiling. The first step is
recognizing the nature of the project: developing a form of strict scrutiny that
can take into account the legitimate needs of the police as well as the high
costs of racial profiling and the wide spread perception among minority
communities that they are being unfairly targeted on the basis of their race or
ethnicity. As long as the myth of unitary strict scrutiny maintains its
stranglehold on legal discourse, this project will not happen.
CONCLUSION: THE MANY FACES OF STRICT SCRUTINY
There is no single, unitary “strict scrutiny” test that the Supreme Court
applies to all government decision making based on race. Redistricting
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decisions, different forms of affirmative action and racial profiling all involve
race, but they are very different legal areas, each with its own highly
individual histories, contexts, and competing sets of values. The myth of
unitary strict scrutiny has caused a great deal of unnecessary confusion. As
noted above, once we recognize that the forms of strict scrutiny in Croson
(involving remedial affirmative action) and Grutter (involving diversity-based
affirmative action) are very different, a case such as Parents Involved in
Community Schools becomes far easier to predict and explain.
This raises the question of why the Court has continued to insist that it is
applying a single test called strict scrutiny to race cases, when it is so clearly
applying a multiplicity of tests instead. While explaining judicial behavior is
outside of the scope of this article, we do want to briefly offer one speculative
explanation for judges’ insistence that there is only one strict scrutiny test.
The idea that federal judges, who are not democratically elected, defer to the
democratic process in most cases, but heighten scrutiny of laws that affect
minorities, has played a crucial role in the argument over judicial legitimacy.
The idea that the courts have a special obligation to protect minorities
precisely because courts are not subject to untrammeled majoritarianism has
been the central defense of the courts against charges of judicial meddling
with democratic decision making.  Thus, the simple two-tier system in which185
the courts normally defer to the legislature but sharpen their scrutiny of race-
based laws is a concept that judges are likely to reflexively embrace. The idea
that the courts have devised different tests to fit various policy areas might
strike a judicial nerve about acting as unelected policy makers. The notion that
judges are merely sharpening their scrutiny of race-based decision making,
rather than making substantive decisions about what, for example, affirmative
action programs and congressional districts should actually look like, is
probably quite appealing to judges even if it does not accurately describe what
the courts are doing.
The myth of a “one size fits all” form of strict scrutiny, though, has
hampered the Court’s ability to respond to the claims of gays and lesbians who
allege various forms of discrimination and of racial and ethnic minorities who
allege that they are victims of racial profiling. The Court can do better than
this. Once strict scrutiny is seen for what it really is—a flexible tool that has
different meanings in different legal areas—the courts will be better able to
respond to contemporary equal protection cases that are currently outside of
the courts’ comfort zone. Further, with greater awareness of the different tests,
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schools can have a better understanding of how they can constitutionally strive
to achieve diversity and government entities will better understand how they
can seek to remedy past and present discrimination. None of this will be easy
of course, but a clearer understanding of the multiplicity of strict scrutiny tests
that the Supreme Court already uses would be an important first step in the
right direction.
